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EUROPE A}ID THE U. S. :
HOW ALIKE, HOW DIFFERENT?
There follows the main points of a speech
by the European Commission President, Mr.
Gaston Thorn, which was delivered to a
symposium on US-EEC relations on
October 19th, in Nice.
In his opening remarks, President Thorn gave a historical
review on the Atlantic rel-ationship in all three of its main
aspects political, economic and military. Mr. Thorn
stressed the enormous contribution the United States had
made to the revival of the post-Second World War Europe. He
then went on to examine the current state of European,/American
relations. What follows is translated from French.
".. . Recent world events and threats to peace have underlj-ned
more strongly that ever the basic identity between ourpolitical and economic systems and our goa1s. How then
can we explain the growj-ng barrage of mutual- criticism which
is flying back and forth across the Atlantic?
The internal- economic crj-sis goes on. The continuing every-
day problems tempt both partners to become introspective and
prompt politicians to indulge in strong words for internal
consumption. The result is that suspicion and mistrust grow
and doubts arise about the real intentions of the other part-
ner. Differing specific interests may then become magnified
out of aI1 proportion. Europe is accused of being seduced by
the siren song of neutralism while Europeans think they see a
new form of j-sol-ationism arising in America. The Americans
appear to be so intent on the East-West confl-ict that they
tend not to see any other aspect of the problem.
At the beginning of my address, I asked whether the wind that
was blowing was the wind of j-solationism or one of greater
unity of purpose between the two principal partners of the
Western world.
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As long ago as 1965, Henry Kissinger looked at the problemsfacing the Atlantic alliance at the beginning of the period
of detente in his book "The Troubled Partnership". He
concluded that the alliance, forged at a time when theUnited States was incontestably the dominant partner, had
still not found a new balance to accommodate Europe's refound
strength on the economic front at least, and even on thepolitical front too.
Today, sixteen years l-ater, this has still not been resolved.
The European pi1Iar of the "two-pillar partnership", ir which
Kennedy wished a united Europe and the United States to
sharg has still not been erected. In fact, a considerable
section of European public opinion is challenging the needfor a defence policy while, at the same time, the situation
outside gives cause for concern. The Soviet Uni-on's arms
strength, events in Cambodia and the occupation ofAfghanistan show that the Soviet Union's intentions are still
expansionist. For a year Poland has lived under the permanentthreat of foreign intervention which would deal the death blowto what is left of detente in Europe. The assassination of
Anwar Sadat reminds us that the unresolved struggle in theMiddle East is a constant threat to our own security.
In the face of this external challenge and the internalproblems which confront us daily, I should like to proposethat we put behind us the sterile wrangling over j-ssues of
minor importance and resolve to create a closer union betweenthe Community and the United States.
To do thisr we must make maximum use of the mechanisms which
exist to deal with specific problems, especially those
affecting trade, and we must refrect on the kind of dialogue
which is required in other areas.
Let us try to concentrate on points of common interest ratherthan search for scapegoats.
Was that not how the Marshall Plan was conceived? That
reflected common interests: democracy had to be safeguarded
and defended in a large part of the Western world and Americanindustry needed a "mega-market" which could absorb its
enormous output when it switched production from the weapons
of war to the goods of peace.
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Now, rather than the two sides shouting louder and louder
about American interest rates or the CAP, a more constructive
approach would be for us to try to understand the reasons for
our respective policies and seek ways of makj-ng them more
consistent with both our common interests and those of eachpartner.
But, in reality, are our interests so different? I do not
think so.
For example, neither the American public nor the Reagan
Administration is pleased to see high j-nterest rates, for
they are an obstacle to economic recovery and they depress
WalI Street. High interest rates are, howeveq, a means to an
end about which we are in agreement with America - the removal
of the inflationary, and therefore destabiLiz:-ng, elements
which disrupt economic decisions both internally and inter-
nationally.
It is also probably true that high interest rates in the
United States have pushed European rates above the level we
would have wished. This does not mean that we are pursuing
contradictory policies but rather that our policy mix is
sliqhtly different.
The real reason for European concern over American interest
rates is their impact on the exchange rates of our currencies
resulting from the disproportionate influence of the dollar
on financial markets.
But we must also recognize that the internal tensions of the
EMS exacerbated the problems caused by high American interest
rates and the dollar exchange rate until the realignment on
4 October. But after this realignment, and you wiII have
observed for yourselves how smoothly it was done, the future
trend of the dollar should be far less of a problem for the
Community.
Disagreement across the Atlantic about the level of interest
rates is perhaps only a reflection of the international
monetary system. If we recognize thisr w€ shall understandbetter what is happening and perhaps we shall be able to
work to improve the system.
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We must now consolidate what has been gained by the successive
rounds of trade negotiations since the sixties by renewing
efforts to remove barriers to invisible trade and giving freshimpetus to the movement for monetary reform which ran aground
on the beaches of Jamaica five years ago.
The steps which the Community is about to take to consotidate
and develop the EllS should contribute towards world monetary
stability and give the communj,ty a great say in internationat
monetary cooperation.
For the second stage of the EMS progress needs to be made and
agreement rapidly reached on the following points: the nature,
structure and responsibilities of the institutions responsiblefor managing the EMsr great€r use of the Ecu, particularly intransactions with the centrar banks, and the consolidatj-on
and development of community credit systems managed by the EMF.
A11 this will serve to strengthen the foundations of the
monetary system and confirm the communityrs determination to
secure greater stability in international monetary relations.
The common Market has been and sti1l is a key factor in the
management of the international trading system and its
existence was indispensable to the opening of the DiIIon Round,the Kennedy Round and the Tokyo Round which hetped both toliberarize international trade and to buttress GATT againstthe often severe pressures favouring protectionism.
The liberalization of international trade cannot make progress
unress there is order on the monetary front, not only at worldlevel, but between the Community countries too.
The EMF is not only essential to monetary and economic negotia-tion and coordination at worrd level but a precondition forfree trade and survival of the Common lvtarket. It is a
charrenge which Europe cannot ignore in the interests of agreater Atlantic and international economic order.
The same argument could be applied to growing American concern
about certain aspects of the common Agricultural policy.
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Let us begin by recognizing that while systems may differ,
agricultural markets are usually organi zed. The diversity
of systems can be explained by numerous factors such as
security of supply, income distribution, and the power
wielded by lobbies on both sj-des of the Atlantic.
The need for changes in agricultural policy 
- 
particularly
ours cannot be denied. Difficult though it may be, it is
a must if the Community's budget is to play its proper role,if expenditure is to be kept within reasonable limits.
This then is another area in which our interests coincide,
an area in which disagreements used to be the order of theday. It would be unfortunate if our efforts to revamp our
agricultural policy were to be impeded by a new "chicken war"
or the 1ike.
On the North-South issue, in other words on relations between
developed and developing countries, I can see an Atlantic war
of words looming. I can visualize Europe being accused of
not importing enough from the developing countries and theUnited States being criticized, for not providing enough inthe way of development aid. The truth of the matter is that
Europe does more on both points. But this is not the right
way to approach the problem.
Any deadlock in North-South dj-scussions resulting from aprolonged dispute between the United States and Europe could
upset economic relations between the Atrantic powers in thelong term.
what is to stop us endeavouring to improve on our performancein areas where our record is poor?
Why shouldnr t the United States and the Community move aheadtogether, the United States on the aid front by giving more
support to the fMF and multilateral development bhnks, the
Community on the services front, banks and invisibles for
example. Better stilt why shouldn't we work together tofurther energy cooperation with the Third Wor1d, to encourage
and protect foreign investment in the developing countries.This was first advocated by the Commission in 1974 and the
Reagan Administration is now looking into the possibilities.
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Shouldn't we attach greater importance to devising a schemefor cooperation in new fields? I am thinking in particular
of the varj-ous sectors of research and development which
wilt shape tomorrow's world.
Perhaps this is the time to give cross-Atlantic cooperation
on R and D a new lease of life with the ultimate aim of
promoting our own economic arowth and facilitating develop-
ment in less fortunate countries.
A like1y area could be joint research into new technologies
for saving energy and exploiting new sources geothermal
energy, solar energy or biomass energy. If we were to
Succeed, we could lessen tensions associated with oil supplies
and give a boost to the development of indigenous energy
sources in the developing countries.
Similarly, more effective collaboration in coal or nuclear
energy R and D should enable us to promote the technologi-es
that will be so badly needed on both sides of the Atlantic.Scientific collaboration should not be confined to energy
alone, although present difficulties make it an obvious choice.
It shoutd go much further to embrace all the scientific
disciplines of the future, such as telematics, biotechnology,
space and so on.
Nor should collaboration be confj-ned, ds so often in the past-,
to areas in which the public sector provides the bulk of thefinance. We must devise mechanisms which would create a
favourable climate for collaboration between our universities
and our industrj-es in the area of advanced technology.
The technologies of the future should make it possible for
the men and women of tomorrow to evaluate and exploit ourplanet's resources more effectively and live in a better
worl-d. It is for us, the advanced industrialized nations of
today, to work together to ensure that this technology is
harnessed not merely to our particular needs but to those of
the world as a whole.
The objective is undoubtedly an ambitious one. But it could
be achieved if collaboration between the United States and
Europe were organized in a coherent fashion. The idea
merits reflection, because a lot is at stake.
-7-
I am aware, ladies and gentlemen, of the obstacles, theproblems, the inertia which hinders all forms of progress.
My aim today has been to plead for a more vital, a more
active partnership between the United States and Europe.
I know that Europe does not always speak with one voice. I
realize that in many cases it is difficult for the UnitedStates to seek Europe's opinion because it does not know
who to ask, and consultations with only some of the member
states is no way of solving the problems.
If we want a stronger Atlantic alliance and dialogue with
the United States we mustr Ers Henry Kissinger said a long
time d9o, strengthen the European pillar. The Commission
of which I am President is doing everything in its power
to do just this, because it is weII aware that, without a
strong Europe, all that has been achieved over the l-ast few
decades could be put in jeopardy.
But the United States and Europe together can take up the
challenge of the future and move towards greater cohesion in
the Western worl-d and hence towards greater international
stability. "

